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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of vertical integration on product quality. Contrary to
previous ndings, it is shown that integration decreases quality in many natural situations.
In general, the direction of the quality change is governed by three e¤ects that are isolated
in the model. This separation allows an analysis of important special cases like the manufac-
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nal good producer relationship, the deregulation
of network infrastructure, and the provision of promotional services through independent dis-
tributors.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the impact of vertical integration on product characteristics in supply chains
with market power. In particular, it tries to shed light on the question how product quality is
a¤ected by the market structure. In antitrust and regulatory contexts defendants often argue
that a vertically integrated rm provides a higher level of product quality than separate entities.
During the process of privatizing the German railway, for instance, Deutsche Bahn contended that
a vertical separation of railway system and passenger transport should be avoided to maintain
quality. Similarly, in Hilti v. European Commission, the Hilti Corporation, a producer of nail
guns used in construction, held that its guns should only be loaded with cartridges containing its
own nails because potential downstream competitors allegedly produced inferior components of a
dangerous nature.
These arguments nd support in the theoretical literature. Tirole (1988) argues that in the
provision of retailersservices that make the manufacturers good more attractive to consumers,
there is downstream moral hazard in the sense that retailers do not take the positive externality
into account that service provision exerts on producers. This suggests that independent retailers
provide a lower service level than vertically integrated rms. Using a similar model Rey and Vergé
(2008) propose that "[t]he distributor will choose [...] too little e¤ort. The basic reason is that
when choosing level of e¤ort and its price, the distributor does not take into account the impact
of these decisions on the producers prot" (p. 363).
In the above models, investment occurs downstream. However, equivalent conclusions were
drawn by papers that analyze upstream investment or bilateral investment. Economides (1999)
nds that vertical integration of successive monopolies always increases the provision of quality.
Buehler et al. (2004) largely conrm this result. While they provide two numerical examples where
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integration may decrease quality, they argue that these are contrived. The paper concludes that
"incentives to invest are generally smaller under vertical separation than under integration" (p.
255). The main argument is the same as proposed by the previous literature: "the network owner
invests less than under integration, as she does not take positive quality e¤ects on downstream
demand into account" (p. 260).
Using a general model of vertical separation that nests previous approaches as special cases, this
paper will show that the above presumption that vertical integration increases quality is wrong.
As it turns out, Tiroles (1988) focus on the service externality is misleading: an independent
retailer actually provides a higher level of services than an integrated rm. This is also true
in Rey and Vergés (2008) model, if it werent for a mistake the authors make in deriving their
prediction. While Economidess (1999) and Buehler et al.s (2004) results are valid, they rest on
specic assumptions on demand, costs, and the timing of investment.1 The particular assumptions
they make are well-suited to characterize quality adjustments in the particular special case they
analyze (deregulation of network infrastructure).2 However, they are less apt to characterize more
general vertical chains (like the relationships between a manufacturer and a retailer or between
an intermediate good and a nal good producer). This, however, is the focus of this paper and as
will be shown below, quality turns out to be lower under integration in many natural situations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of successive monopolies with
endogenous quality choice that improves on previous approaches by allowing general demand and
cost functions and investment either at the upstream or downstream level. As in the previous
literature, quality choice will be driven by the impact of double marginalization. The level of
1Economides (1999) assumes very particular demand and cost structures and does not allow for sequential
investments. While Buehler et al. (2004) use general demand functions, they assume away variable costs and do
not allow for downstream investment. As will be shown, these assumptions create a bias towards quality increasing
vertical integration.
2See Economides (1996, p. 690) for a discussion of how his paper relates to the general literature on network
externalities.
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quality is shown to depend on three distinct e¤ects which are separately analyzed in Section 3
(the demand e¤ect), Section 4 (the commitment e¤ect), and Section 5 (the scale e¤ect). Section
6 contains a welfare analysis. Section 7 discusses a number of extensions and Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider the market for a vertically di¤erentiated product which is characterized by its quality
q  0. Demand at price p is given by the function x(p; q) with inverse p(x; q). Assume that
p() is smooth in both arguments and that px(x; q) < 0 and pq(x; q) > 0 for all x and q, where
subscripts denote partial derivatives. Moreover, it will be assumed that pxq(x; q) < 0, implying
that consumers with a higher willingness to pay for the product also have a larger preference for
quality.3
The good is produced in a vertical production process which consists of a monopoly upstream
rm (indexed by 1) and a monopoly downstream rm (indexed by 2), which may or may not be
vertically integrated. The upstream rm rst produces an intermediate good of quality q1  0
which it sells at transfer price pt to the downstream rm. The downstream rm in turn produces
the nal good by choosing a quality q2  0 to rene the input.4 The good is then sold to the
market at price p. The nal quality q is determined by the quality levels provided by the two rms,
so that q = q(q1; q2), where it is assumed that q() is weakly increasing in both q1 and q2. Firms
i = 1; 2 have smooth cost functions Ci(x; qi) which are strictly increasing in both arguments.
Throughout the paper, it will be assumed that second order conditions hold to guarantee the
existence of a solution.
3For most circumstances this is a natural assumption which is routinely made in the literature on price dis-
crimination (e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Section 7 discusses how the results of the paper change when instead
pxq(x; q)  0.
4While the model is formulated here as an intermediate/nal good producer relationship, it can equivalently be
interpreted as a manufacturer/retailer relationship with wholesale price pt.
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In the general form presented here, the equilibrium of the model is determined by several
interacting e¤ects. As a consequence, stubbornly solving the rmsmaximization problems yields
little in the way of understanding the structure of the solution. We will therefore proceed by an
alternative route, identifying the three distinct e¤ects that govern the relationship between vertical
integration and product quality. Table 1 gives a summary of the e¤ects and whether they tend to
increase or decrease quality under integration. As can be seen there, the rst of the three e¤ects
is always present, while the second and the third e¤ect only appear under specic circumstances.
Section 3 will rst analyze the model under the assumption that those circumstances are not
fullled. It will be demonstrated that in this case quality under integration is always lower than
with separate rms. Sections 4 and 5 then add the characteristics needed for the second and third
e¤ect, demonstrating that both tend to increase the quality under integration. As will become
apparent, this separation of e¤ects allowa studying important special cases of vertical chains
like the manufacturer/retailer relationship, the intermediate/nal good producer relationship, the
provision of promotional services, and the deregulation of network industries.
E¤ects of integration Quality change Occurrence
Demand e¤ect (Section 3) Decrease Always
Commitment e¤ect (Section 4) Increase Upstream investment
Scale e¤ect (Section 5) Increase Quality scale economies
Table 1: Quality E¤ects
3 The Demand E¤ect
We will rst analyze the problem under conditions that ensure that the second and third e¤ect
are absent. These conditions turn out to be that the upstream rm has no impact on quality (i.e.,
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there is downstream investment) and that the cost of quality provision does not decrease with the
scale of production (i.e., there are no scale economies regarding quality provision). More formally,
we will assume the following in this section.
Condition 1 (Downstream investment) @q=@q1 = 0.
Condition 2 (No quality scale economies) @C
i=@qi
x  @
2Ci
@qi@x
for i = 1; 2.
Condition 1 of course implies that q1 = 0 in equilibrium so that q = q(0; q2). Without loss of
generality, we let the downstream rm choose q directly, setting q2 = q, so we have downstream
investment. To get a clearer picture which types of cost functions satisfy Condition 2, consider
the cost structures C = F+ c(q)x and ~C = F (q) + cx. Cost structure C, where quality increases
variable costs, fullls condition 2. Cost structure ~C, on the other hand, where quality increases
xed costs, does not.
The conditions laid out in this section correspond to an intermediate/nal good producer
relationship in industries with large scale production. Manufacturers buy a homogeneous input
from the upstream rm which is then rened to a nal product. As the good is already produced
at a signicant scale, further increases in the volume of production do not make the provision of
quality cheaper on a per unit basis. As an example, one could think of a car manufacturer that
buys steel as an input.5
We will begin by analyzing the equilibrium under the vertically integrated structure. In that
case the integrated rms prot function is
 = xp(x; q)  C1(x)  C2(x; q).
5 In the case where signicant scale e¤ects are present in intermediate/nal good producer relationships the scale
e¤ect becomes relevant. See Proposition 4 below.
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Maximizing prots with respect to x and q gives
@
@x
= p+ xpx   C1x   C2x = 0 (1)
and
@
@q
= xpq   C2q = 0. (2)
The corresponding second order conditions are
@2
@x2
= 2px + xpxx   C1xx   C2xx < 0, (3)
@2
@q2
= xpqq   C2qq < 0, (4)
and
@2
@x2
@2
@q2
 

@2
@x@q
2
= (2px + xpxx   C1xx   C2xx) (5)
(xpqq   C2qq)  (pq + xpxq   C2xq)2 > 0.
The solution is characterized by the usual equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue on
the one hand, and of marginal willingness to pay for quality and marginal cost of quality on the
other hand.
Next, we will turn to the disintegrated solution. Under separation, the downstream rms
prot function is
2 = x [p(x; q)  pt]  C2(x; q).
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Taking the transfer price pt as given, rm 2 maximizes its prot with respect to x and q. This
yields
@2
@x
= p+ xpx   pt   C2x = 0 (6)
and
@2
@q
= xpq   C2q = 0. (7)
The corresponding second order conditions are
@22
@x2
= 2px + xpxx   C2xx < 0, (8)
@22
@q2
= xpqq   C2qq < 0, (9)
and
@22
@x2
@22
@q2
 

@22
@x@q
2
= (2px + xpxx   C2xx) (10)
(xpqq   C2qq)  (pq + xpxq   C2xq)2 > 0.
In the rst stage, the upstream rm chooses the transfer price pt, anticipating the downstream
rms marketing decision x(pt) in the second stage. Its prot function therefore is
1 = x(pt)pt   C1(x(pt)).
The optimal transfer price is then determined by the rst order condition
@1
@pt
=
dx
dpt

pt   C1x(x(pt))

+ x = 0. (11)
8
Comparing the two regimes, Proposition 1 arrives at the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume Conditions 1 and 2 hold. Then successive monopolies provide a higher
level of quality than a vertically integrated rm. Given output, quality is such that joint prots
are maximized.
Proof. Note rst that if the upstream rm were to sell her input at marginal costs (pt = C1x),
then equations (1) and (2) would be identical to equations (6) and (7) and the integrated and
the disintegrated solution would fall together. As marginal cost pricing results in zero prots,
however, it is straightforward to see that we must have pt > C1x. Applying the implicit function
theorem to equations (6) and (7) then yields
dq
dpt
=  

@22
@x2
@22
@x@pt
@22
@x@q
@22
@q@pt
 =

@22
@x2
@22
@x@q
@22
@x@q
@22
@q2
 (12)
=   pq + xpxq   C
2
xq
(2px + xpxx   C2xx)(xpqq   C2qq)  (pq + xpxq   C2xq)2
> 0.
where (10) and the fact that by (7) pq   C2xq = C2q =x   C2xq  0 (this is Condition 2) have been
used to determine the sign. Hence, pt > C1x implies that q is higher under non-integration than
under integration.
For the second part of the proposition, rst observe that the level of quality that maximizes
joint prots for a given x is dened by (2). Noting that the actual quality choice by the independent
downstream rm is given by (7) which is identical to (2) completes the proof. 
The fact that disintegrated rms provide a higher level of quality has a simple intuition. Since
the seller of the input good is an independent monopolist, he will charge a transfer price above
marginal costs. The result is double marginalization which causes a restriction of output. Since
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a more exclusive group of consumers is served, there is an incentive to adjust the level of quality
upwards.
As we have downstream investment here, the model is useful to evaluate the question whether
retailers fall short of providing e¢ cient services for the products they sell. In general, an upstream
producer will worry that a retailer does not put enough e¤ort into promotional activities. This
problem has been termed downstream moral hazard by Tirole (1988, p. 178) who shows that the
retailer exerts a positive externality on the producer (increased services lead to higher demand
for the producers products). As the retailer does not internalize this externality, the provided
service quality is too low given the input price.
The existence of this quality-reducing externality and the term "moral hazard" suggest that
independent retailers provide less services than a vertically integrated monopolist (see Rey and
Vergé, 2008, p. 363, for a more recent paper drawing this conclusion). Whether this is actually
the case can readily be analyzed within the scope of this section as both Tiroles and Rey and
Vergés formulations are special cases of the more general model presented here, satisfying both
Conditions 1 and 2. Following Proposition 1, the surprising result is that despite the fact that
they do not take the positive externality into account that they exert on producers, independent
retailers provide a higher level of promotional services.
The reason for this is that there is an externality taking the input price pt as given. However,
it is of little use to take an endogenous variable in a dynamic game as exogenously given, as it is
chosen strategically to a¤ect the subsequent actions of other players. So in fact, the externality
between retailer and producer is no source for downstream moral hazard as proposed by the
previous literature. As Proposition 1 demonstrates, retailers really provide a level of services that
maximizes joint prots of the independent rms.6
6Note, however, that in models with more than one retailer as in Mathewson and Winter (1984, 1993), retailers
may exert positive externalities on each other. This happens, for instance, if one retailers advertising for a product
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Tiroles vertical externality is also Buehler et al.s (2004) explanation why vertical integration
tends to increase quality in their model. Since this externality is not a source of underinvestment,
however, there must be another reason why integration increases quality in Buehler et al. (2004)
and Economides (1999). As the following two sections show, there are two such reasons. First,
as discussed in Section 4, upstream investment allows rms to use an underprovision of quality
as a commitment to reduce excessive downstream prices. Second, as discussed in Section 5, scale
e¤ects lead to a similar result.
4 The Commitment E¤ect
We will now relax Condition 1 to show that if it does not hold, a second e¤ect appears that
inuences the quality provision of independent monopolists. For simplicity, we will consider a
situation where only the upstream rms investment is relevant for the overall level of quality.
Corresponding to last sections procedure, it will therefore be assumed that q = q(q1; 0) = q1. As
will become clear below, the results carry over to the general case where q2 is also relevant. In
addition to tractability, this approach has the advantage that it represents an important special
case, namely the situation where a manufacturer sells its products via a retailer (who does not
provide extensive services).
The vertically integrated solution is again given by equations (1) to (5), with the cost functions
indices exchanged as the quality investment is now made by rm one instead of rms two.7
increases another retailers demand for the product. In this case, of course, retailers may underprovide promotional
activities.
7The correspondingly altered equations will be referred to as equations (1a) to (5a) in what follows.
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If the two rms are independent, the downstream rms prot function is
2 = x [p(x; q)  pt]  C2(x).
Given an input good of price pt and quality q, it will therefore set the quantity such that
@2
@x
= p+ xpx   pt   C2x = 0. (13)
The corresponding second order condition is
@22
@x2
= 2px + xpxx   C2xx < 0. (14)
The upstream rms prot function is
1 = x(pt; q)pt   C1(x(pt; q); q).
The optimal choice of pt and q is then given by
@1
@pt
=
dx
dpt

pt   C1x(x(pt; q); q)

+ x = 0 (15)
and
@1
@q
=
dx
dq

pt   C1x(x(pt; q); q)
  C1q (x(pt; q); q) = 0. (16)
Comparing these two solution we arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume Condition 2 holds. Then successive monopolies provide a higher level of
quality (if the demand e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong) or a lower level of quality (if the commitment
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e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong) than a vertically integrated rm. Given output, quality is below the
level that maximizes joint prots.
Proof. The most convenient way of proving this proposition is by way of graphical represen-
tation of the equilibrium. We will rst depict the vertically integrated equilibrium in (x; q) space.
The equilibrium point is represented by the intersection of the two curves that are dened by
equations (1.1a) and (1.2a). Using the implicit function theorem, the curve @=@x = 0 is found
to have the slope
dq
dx

@=@x=0
=  
@2
@x2
@2
@x@q
=  2px + xpxx   C
1
xx   C2xx
pq + xpxq   C1xq
. (17)
Likewise, the curve @=@q = 0 has slope
dq
dx

@=@q=0
=  
@2
@x@q
@2
@q2
=  pq + xpxq   C
1
xq
xpqq   C1qq
. (18)
By (1.3a), the numerator of (17) is negative and by (1.4a) the denominator of (18) is also smaller
than zero at the equilibrium point. Hence, around the equilibrium, the slope of both curves has
the same sign as @2=(@x@q). By (1.2a), pq  C1xq = C1q =x C1xq  0, where the inequality follows
from Condition 2. Therefore, we must have @2=(@x@q) < 0 so both curves are downward sloping.
Comparing (17) and (18), one nds that the curve @=@x = 0 is strictly steeper than the curve
@=@q = 0 if and only if
@2
@x2
@2
@q2
>

@2
@x@q
2
.
Around the equilibrium we know this to be the case from (1.5a). Accordingly, Figure 1 represents
the solution with the curve @=@x = 0 falling steeper than the curve @=@q = 0. Next we will
13
Figure 1: Equilibrium with upstream investment
determine how the curves shift under independent pricing. From (15) we rst obtain
pt =   xdx
dpt
+ C1x. (19)
Substituting (19) into (13) gives
@2
@x
= p+ xpx   C1x   C2x +
x
dx
dpt
= 0 (20)
which is the curve @2=@x = 0 that describes the choice of x under disintegration. Note that (20)
is exactly equal to (1.1a) with x=(dx=dpt) added. The sign of this expression is equal to the sign
of
dx
dpt
=  
@22
@x@pt
@22
@x2
=
1
2px + xpxx   C2xx
< 0 (21)
which is derived by applying the implicit function theorem to (13). In view of (20) the question
is: given some value of q, how must x be changed in equation (1.1a) to yields a positive expression
such that (20) is fullled? As @2=@x2 < 0 by (1.3a), it turns out that x must be decreased.
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Hence, the curve @2=@x = 0 lies to the left of the curve @=@x = 0 as depicted in Figure 1.
This is the demand e¤ect of independent quality provision: as is apparent from the graphical
representation, it increases q and decreases x. The curve that describes the choice of q under
disintegration is found by substituting (19) in (16) which yields
@1
@q
=  dx
dq
x
dx
dpt
  C1q = 0. (22)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (13) again we nd that
dx
dq
=  
@22
@x@q
@22
@x2
=   pq + xpxq
2px + xpxx   C2xx
.
Noting that this expression is equal to  (pq + xpxq) dxdpt and substituting it into (22) then gives
@1
@q
= xpq   C1q + x2pxq = 0. (23)
Note that (23) is exactly equal to (1.2a) with x2pxq < 0 added. The question here is, how must q
be changed in (1.2a) while holding x constant such that (1.2a) yields something positive, thereby
fullling (23). As @2=@q2 < 0 by (1.4a), it turns out that a decrease in q is necessary. This is
represented in Figure 1 by the fact that the curve @1=@q = 0 lies below the curve @=@q = 0.
This is the commitment e¤ect which is seen to decrease q and to increase x. Obviously, the exact
position of q under disintegration depends on the relative strength of demand and commitment
e¤ect.
Finally, the second part of the proposition has to be demonstrated. Given an arbitrary x the
level of q that maximizes joint prots is implicitly dened by (1.2a), yielding pq C1q =x = 0. Note,
however, that rearranging (23), the quality that is provided under disintegration can be described
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by the equation pq   C1q =x = xpxq < 0. Using (1.4a) we therefore arrive at the conclusion that q
is smaller than the amount that maximizes joint prots. 
Proposition 2 shows that when there is upstream investment, two e¤ects govern the quality
provision of an independent upstream rm (which are graphically displayed in Figure 1). First,
there is the demand e¤ect that tends to increase quality in the disintegrated case for the same
reason as in the last section. Anticipating double marginalization, the manufacturer increases
quality as goods will be sold to a more exclusive class of consumers. Second, and new in this
section, is the commitment e¤ect. As the quality level is chosen before the retailer decides on
its markup, the quality level can be set strategically in order to inuence the extent of double
marginalization downstream. In order to prevent the downstream rm from demanding a high
margin, the upstream rm strategically reduces the level of quality. The manufacturer e¤ectively
produces a mass product (in terms of quality) in order to commit the retailer not to market it as
a luxury good (in terms of quantity).
Note that this commitment introduces an ine¢ ciency into the provision of quality. The up-
stream rms behavior here is akin to what a social planner does in a second best world: when
there is a distortion in one dimension of the market (here the price-distortion caused by dou-
ble marginalization), it becomes optimal to introduce a distortion in a second dimension (here
by reducing quality). Note also that the result of Proposition 2 immediately carries over to the
more general case where both q1 and q2 are important: if quality may be higher or lower un-
der integration without downstream investment, it may also be higher or lower with downstream
investment.
From the proof of Proposition 2 one can see that the demand e¤ect is particularly strong
when demand is more concave (less convex). Intuitively this corresponds to a situation where a
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relatively large proportion of consumers has a high willingness to pay. The commitment e¤ect
will be important whenever pxq is large, implying that quality reductions are particularly e¤ective
in deterring retailers from going upmarket. In order to be able to get a more direct feel for the
relative impact of the two e¤ects, it may, however, be desirable to refer to a concrete special case
that illustrates when the model tips from a lower to a higher choice of quality. Proposition 3
provides such a case.
Proposition 3 Assume that both rms have a constant returns to scale technology. Then, if the
demand function is linear in the price, successive monopolies with upstream investment provide
the same level of quality as a vertically integrated rm.
Proof. The requirement of constant returns to scale implies that the cost functions are of the
form C1(x; q) = xc1(q) and C2(x) = xc2, where c2 is a constant. Linearity in p implies that inverse
demand takes the form p = a(q)x + b(q) for some functions a(q) and b(q). Using these demand
and cost functions, it is straightforward to show that (1.1a) now corresponds to
2a(q)x+ b(q)  c1(q)  c2 = 0 (24)
and that (1.2a) corresponds to
x =
c01(q)  b0(q)
a0(q)
. (25)
Likewise, (13) is given by
4a(q)x+ b(q)  c1(q)  c2 = 0 (26)
and (16) by
x =
c01(q)  b0(q)
2a0(q)
. (27)
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Substituting (24) in (25) and rearranging or (26) in (27) and rearranging both yields
2a(q)
c01(q)  b0(q)
a0(q)
+ b(q)  c1(q)  c2 = 0, (28)
which is a function of q alone. Thus, the level of quality produced by independent rms is identical
to the level that a vertically integrated manufacturer provides. 
Proposition 3 tells us that with constant returns and linear demand, a producer with an
independent retailer is equivalent to a vertically integrated manufacturer in terms of quality pro-
vision.8 ;9 The acquisition of a retailer by a producer will therefore only a¤ect the retail price but
not the product as such. Note that only linearity in p is required, so that demand and cost func-
tions are generally allowed to be non-linear in q. This is important because the scaling of q can
only be sensibly dened up to a positive monotone transformation, which would render linearity
requirements void.
5 The Scale E¤ect
After showing that a relaxation of Condition 1 can alter Section 3s conclusion that independent
rms always provide more quality, we will now see that the same result can be obtained if instead
Condition 2 is relaxed. Contrary to Section 3, we therefore assume that the cost function is such
that quality investments become cheaper with scale. That is, the per unit costs of producing a
given level of quality decreases with the number of units that are produced.
Obviously, Section 3s rst order conditions still apply in this section. The equilibrium char-
8While the generality of this result should not be overemphasized, linearity may be more than a convenient focal
point of the analysis. Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) estimate manufacturer and retailer margins in the car industry
and can not reject the hypothesis that the demand functions for the large number of models they consider are linear.
9The result of Proposition 3 readily extends to the class of cost functions of the form C = F + c(q)x, which
nests all constant returns functions. The latter were chosen in the proposition merely because of their particular
importance in the long run.
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acteristics implied by them, however, change as Condition 2 can not be applied anymore. This is
stated in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Assume Condition 1 holds. Then successive monopolies provide a higher level of
quality (if the demand e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong) or a lower level of quality (if the scale e¤ect
is su¢ ciently strong) than a vertically integrated rm. Given output, quality is such that joint
prots are maximized.
Proof. The proof is immediate by following the proof of Proposition 1 step by step and
noting that the numerator of dq=dpt is now indeterminate in sign as xpxq < 0, while pq   C2xq =
C2q =x  C2xq > 0 since Condition 2 does not hold. 
The scale e¤ect that is introduced here by assuming that Condition 2 does not hold tends
to decrease the quality that independent rms provide. The reason is straightforward. Double
marginalization reduces the quantity sold. But as the provision of quality becomes more costly
when production is at a smaller scale, the downstream rm chooses to o¤er less of it.
The strength of the scale e¤ect is directly determined by the characteristics of the cost function.
Most importantly, if the provision of quality tends to increase xed cost, the scale e¤ect will be
important, while it will be of less relevance if quality provision predominantly a¤ects marginal
costs. This explains why vertical separation of network infrastructure tends to decrease quality
(as suggested by Economides, 1999, and Buehler et al., 2004). Both the scale e¤ect and the
commitment e¤ect are very important in those industries as network investment occurs upstream
and will predominantly increase xed costs. Whenever the commitment e¤ect o¤sets the demand
e¤ect as in Proposition 3, even a small scale e¤ect will necessarily push quality into the negative
under vertical separation.
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6 Welfare
The analysis so far has been positive, describing in some detail how vertical integration inuences
product choice. In this section, we will now turn to the normative question whether vertical
integration is desirable from a welfare point of view. There are two parts to this. First, vertical
integration allows to overcome double marginalization which is unambiguously desirable as prices
are decreased and prots increased. Second, however, we must consider the impact of integration
on quality. As Spence (1975) and Sheshinski (1976) have shown, if output is taken as given,
monopolies provide too little quality from a welfare point of view when pxq < 0. Hence, whenever
higher quality levels can be achieved under disintegration, this makes integration less attractive.
In principle, therefore, the general wisdom that vertical integration of successive monopolies is
benecial could loose its validity once the endogeneity of product characteristics is acknowledged.
To analyze this question formally, let us begin by inspecting the market solution of Section 3,
where Conditions 1 and 2 hold. The welfare function W (x; q) consists of gross consumer surplus
minus the costs of production.
W (x; q) =
xZ
0
p(z; q)dz   C1(x)  C2(x; q) (29)
Maximizing (29) with respect to x and q gives the rst order conditions
@W
@x
= p(x; q)  C1x   C2x = 0 (30)
and
@W
@q
=
xZ
0
pq(z; q)dz   C2q = 0. (31)
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with the associated second order conditions
@2W
@x2
= px   C1xx   C2xx < 0, (32)
@2W
@q2
=
xZ
0
pqq(z; q)dz   C2qq < 0 (33)
and
@2W
@x2
@2W
@q2
 

@2W
@x@q
2
= (px   C1xx   C2xx) (34)

24 xZ
0
pqq(z; q)dz   C2qq
35  (pq   C2xq)2 > 0.
It will again be useful to depict the optimum graphically. Figure 2 shows it as the intersection
of the curves Wx = 0 and Wq = 0, which are given by (30) and (31). To prove that both curves
are indeed downward sloping around the optimum, the implicit function theorem is applied to
(30) and (31) to yield
dq
dx

@W=@x=0
=  
@2W
@x2
@2W
@x@q
=  px   C
1
xx   C2xx
pq   C2xq
< 0 (35)
and
dq
dx

@W=@x=0
=  
@2W
@x@q
@2W
@q2
=   pq   C
2
xqR x
0 pqq(z; q)dz   C2qq
< 0. (36)
The negative signs can be inferred from (32), (33) and the fact that @2W=(@x@q) = pq  C2xq < 0.
To see that this latter cross-derivative is negative rst note that by Condition 2, C2xq  C2q =x.
By (31) in turn, C2q =x =
R x
0 pq(z; q)dz

=x. As pxq < 0 by assumption, we must also haveR x
0 pq(z; q)dz

=x > pq. Thus, C2xq > pq, the desired result.
Comparing the relative slopes of (35) and (36), we immediately nd that the curve Wx = 0 is
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Figure 2: Welfare comparison
steeper than the curve Wq = 0 by (34) as depicted in Figure 2, which completes the picture for
the welfare optimum.
Along the lines of the proof of Proposition 2 we can also represent the integrated and separated
monopoly solution graphically, which are depicted in Figure 2 as the intersection of the curves
x = 0 and q = 0 for the integrated case and 2x = 0 and q = 0 for the disintegrated case.
Using the same techniques as in the proof of Proposition 2 allows demonstrating that the three
monopoly curves indeed lie strictly below the respective welfare curves.
In order to compare the welfare properties of the integrated and disintegrated solution, Figure
2 shows the iso-welfare contours that pass through the monopoly solutions. The contours are
drawn such that welfare is higher under integration than under separation (the better-direction is
inwards), but it is easy to see that this will in general depend on their specic shape, which can
be derived as
dq
dx

W=W (x;q)
=  @W=@x
@W=@q
=   p(x; q)  C
1
x   C2xR x
0 pq(z; q)dz   C2q
(37)
22
by using (30) and (31). This expression (which primarily consists of rst order derivatives) is quite
unrelated to the slopes of the other curves in the gure (which primarily consist of second order
derivatives). Hence, no meaningful general assertion can be made about the relative positions of
the two iso-welfare contours.
Despite this theoretical indeterminacy there is a strong presumption that even if vertical
integration of successive monopolies decreases quality, it is likely to increases welfare. First, note
that vertical integration can not decrease welfare in our model unless monopoly regulation that
increases prices would be e¢ cient. While it is possible to construct theoretical examples of this
kind (see Sheshinski, 1976), they are hardly considered very relevant in practice. Indeed there
is a strong presumption that forcing monopolists to further raise prices is not desirable. Second,
the possibility of welfare improving price increases is only a necessary, not a su¢ cient condition
for vertical separation to be welfare enhancing. Third, the relative welfare merits of vertical
separation are even further weakened in scenarios with a commitment e¤ect and a scale e¤ect. As
shown in Propositions 2 and 4, they lead to a decrease in quality below even the level that rms
would nd optimal given equilibrium output.
7 Extensions and Discussion
This section will discuss a number of aspects of the basic model and analyze some important
extensions.
Double Marginalization
In the basic model, the driving force behind the quality provision of successive monopolies is
double marginalization. In principle, contractual solutions exist that prevent double marginal-
ization and so one may wonder why rms not simply write optimal nonlinear contracts that
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implement the integrated allocation.
The problem with those schemes, however (and the reason why contractual solutions are often
ruled out in the literature), is that they fail to prevent double marginalization in settings that are
more realistic than the idealized textbook exhibition of vertically related markets. For instance,
note that nonlinear pricing schemes leave all potential risk with the downstream rm if demand is
uncertain. Transferring some of the risk to the upstream rm then necessarily involves a wholesale
price above marginal costs (Rey and Tirole, 1986), so double marginalization reappears. But even
if it were optimal for the downstream rm to carry the whole risk, pricing above marginal costs
would still be necessary if there is asymmetric information between the rms concerning future
demand conditions (Gallini and Wright, 1990). Moreover, a variety of historical and regulatory
reasons make coordination di¢ cult (see Smith, 1982). Tirole (1988, p. 176-177) contains a
discussion and further arguments why contractual solutions will in general not make it possible
to eradicate double marginalization.10
What Happens if pxq  0?
The assumption that pxq < 0 was used at several points in this paper. It turns out that, if
one assumes instead that pxq  0, the direction of the demand e¤ect and the commitment e¤ect
change signs. In fact, the output contraction that is caused by double marginalization would lead
rms to decrease quality because consumers with a higher willingness to pay then have a lower
preference for quality. As a result, upstream rms would have an incentive to increase quality in
order to stop downstream rms from restricting output to luxury consumers. The scale e¤ect, on
the other hand, is not a¤ected by the sign of pxq.
10These theoretical arguments are supported by a number of empirical studies that provide evidence for double
marginalization in di¤erent industries. See, for instance, Bresnahan and Reiss (1985), Lafontaine (1995) and West
(2000).
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Ex-ante Investments
In the basic model it was assumed that rms make their choice of quality at the same time
they decide on their price. This is certainly the right order of events in many vertical chains. In
others, it may be more realistic to assume that rms rst simultaneously decide on the level of
quality they want to o¤er and then start a sequential pricing game. This is the case whenever
quality choice is determined by long-standing investments, for example by the construction of a
particular type of production plant or the acquisition of a certain machine.
In the situation analyzed in Section 4, where the upstream rm provides quality, obviously
nothing changes as the upstream rm moves rst anyhow. The case of downstream investment
analyzed in Section 3, however, does change. When the downstream rm makes her quality choice
prior to the upstream rms price decision, the level of quality can be selected strategically to
prevent excessive pricing by the upstream rm. So, maybe not surprisingly, the upstream rm
will consider the commitment e¤ect. In this case Proposition 3, which shows that integration does
not a¤ect quality in linear environments, can be extended to the case of downstream investment.
In general, quality may be higher or lower under integration, depending on the same three e¤ects
that were illustrated in the basic model.
Price Discrimination
As consumers are heterogeneous in their preference for quality, it pays for rms to price
discriminate between them by o¤ering di¤erent qualities. This, however, does not change the
general intuition of the e¤ects that are analyzed in this paper. In fact, it can be shown that
the results of the basic model qualitatively carry over to the case of price discrimination. For
instance, the demand e¤ect implies that successive monopolies provide a smaller range of qualities
containing only higher levels of quality. Likewise, the commitment e¤ect implies that independent
25
rms sell a larger range of qualities, also containing lower levels of quality.
8 Conclusion
The previous literature on the quality e¤ects of vertical integration has concluded that separation
reduces quality because of vertical externalities. As it turned out, however, this presumption
is wrong; under natural conditions separation even increases quality. Using a generic model of
successive monopolies that embeds Tiroles (1988), Buehler et al.s (2004) and Rey and Vergés
(2008) models as special cases, this paper has presented a general framework to analyze vertical
quality provision. It was shown that the choice of quality is governed by three distinct e¤ects
which were isolated in the model. Out of those, only the quality-decreasing e¤ect of vertical
integration is always present, while the two quality-increasing e¤ects appear only in particular
environments. The juxtaposition of these e¤ects has allowed us to provide a more nuanced view
of important special cases.
Section 3 described situations where vertical integration tends to decrease quality (e.g., in the
case of distributors promotional services). Here the demand e¤ect is likely to dominate the other
two e¤ects (if they are present at all). Section 4 described situations where vertical integration
tends to leave quality una¤ected (e.g., in the case of a producer/retailer relationship). With linear
demand and constant returns to scale, the demand e¤ect and the commitment e¤ect even o¤set
each other perfectly. Finally, Section 5 described situations where vertical integration tends to
increase quality (e.g., in the case of network infrastructure). Here both the commitment e¤ect and
the scale e¤ect work against the demand e¤ect, which explains the previous results by Economides
(1999) and Buehler et al. (2004).
It would be interesting to extend the model to a competitive downstream industry, with
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downstream rms o¤ering di¤erentiated products as in Perry and Gro¤ (1985) and Kühn and
Vives (1999). This appears to be a promising avenue for future research.
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